Joseph Blocher

The Guantanamo Three-Step
In a recent Response to my Comment,1 Geoffrey Corn, Eric Talbot Jensen,
and Sean Watts take an interesting stance in defense of the combatant status
review tribunals (CSRTs).2 Their Response does not dispute—and in fact
seems to support—my central argument that CSRTs cannot serve as the
“competent tribunals” required under Article 5 of the Third Geneva
Convention.3 But Corn, Jensen, and Watts come to bury Article 5, not to praise
it. They do so by recasting Article 5 as the third step in a three-part detaineeclassification process whose first two steps are controlled entirely by the
President. These two steps, they argue, render Article 5 tribunals unnecessary
at Guantanamo. This reading raises thorny problems of executive power and
undermines the purpose of Article 5.
i. one step forward
My Comment was a response to the Bush Administration’s argument that
the CSRTs discharged any duty the United States had under Article 5 of the
Geneva Convention to provide “competent” tribunals to determine detainees’
prisoner of war (POW) status. I reasoned that the CSRTs could not fulfill this
function because they classified detainees according to a categorization—that of
“enemy combatant”—which is not coextensive with POW (or non-POW)
status under Article 4.
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Corn, Jensen, and Watts do not dispute this argument. Indeed, they agree
that “the CSRTs did not have authority to make POW classifications”4 and
that “the CSRTs were appropriately precluded from determining POW
status.”5
If only everyone saw it our way. Unfortunately, many argue that a CSRT’s
finding that a detainee is an enemy combatant is precisely equivalent to an
Article 5 tribunal’s finding that he is not a POW. In its brief before the Supreme
Court in Hamdan v. Rumsfeld,6 the government argued that the CSRT process
“clearly discharges any obligation under Article 5 . . . .”7 Secretary of the Navy
Gordon England similarly claimed that the CSRTs went “beyond” the
regulations implementing Article 5,8 and Senator Lindsey Graham put in an
even higher bid, calling the CSRTs “[A]rticle 5 tribunals on steroids.”9 Legal
scholars soon joined the chorus,10 claiming, for example, that “CSRTs more
than fulfill the ‘competent tribunal’ called for under Article 5 of the Geneva
Convention . . . .”11 And then-Circuit Judge John Roberts, writing for the D.C.
Circuit in Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, suggested that the military commission set up
to try Salim Ahmed Hamdan—the same commission which the Supreme
Court, of which Roberts was by that time Chief Justice, struck down a year
later—was a “competent tribunal” under the army regulation implementing
Article 5.12
Even as it struck down the military commissions, however, the Supreme
Court explicitly reserved decision on whether Hamdan’s status as a POW had
been properly adjudicated under Article 5.13 The issue of whether CSRTs fulfill
Article 5’s mandate is thus unfortunately something of a live issue. Corn,
Jensen, and Watts’s Response makes a positive contribution in this debate to
the extent that it rejects the categorization of CSRTs as Article 5 tribunals.
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Perhaps their Response, and my Comment, will help lay to rest the common
misconception that CSRTs were the equivalent of Article 5 tribunals. Whether
or not some other “competent tribunal” could have served the Article 5
function, the CSRTs did not. And yet it is their findings that have been used to
justify the detentions at Guantanamo, and that have been compared—by
scholars, legislators, and the government—to Article 5 tribunals. The purpose
of my Comment was to show the error of that comparison, a critique which
Corn, Jensen, and Watts seem to support.
ii. two steps back
But Corn, Jensen, and Watts don’t try to rehabilitate CSRTs as “competent
tribunals,” or argue that some other decisionmaker fulfilled Article 5’s
requirements. They argue instead that the President’s unilateral
characterizations of the conflict in Afghanistan, and the Taliban and al Qaeda
forces there, removed any possible “doubt” about the POW status of any
detainee at Guantanamo and thus rendered Article 5 tribunals unnecessary.
To reach this result, Corn, Jensen, and Watts argue that the classification of
prisoners in wartime follows a three-step process. A “central command”14 must
first determine that the conflict in which the prisoner was captured is covered
by the Geneva Conventions. It must then “pre-approve[]”15 the opposing
forces as meeting the definitions laid out in Article 4. Finally, and only if these
first two tests are met, Article 5 requires that a “competent tribunal” resolve any
“doubt” about whether a particular detainee belongs to a protected group.
This characterization of the Geneva Convention rests on a controversial
understanding of executive power that the authors acknowledge has spawned a
“debate as to whether the President can rightfully make that determination
under international law . . . .”16 Suffice it to say, law professors17 and courts18
have disputed Corn, Jensen, and Watts’s central argument that the President
can rightfully make sweeping determinations regarding the proper
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classification of a conflict (the first step), or the parties thereto (the second
step), as he has done with regard to the conflict in Afghanistan and to the
Taliban and al Qaeda.19
Perhaps the most heavily criticized of these determinations was the
President’s declaration that the Taliban did not fall within Article 4(A)(1)
despite the fact that the Taliban apparently served as the armed forces of
Afghanistan, a signatory to the Convention, and despite the fact that Article
4(A)(1) makes no mention of the four conditions—hierarchy, insignia, open
arms, and adherence to the laws of war—that the Administration claimed the
Taliban failed to meet.20 Corn, Jensen, and Watts’s argument rests entirely on
the legitimacy and accuracy of the President’s novel reading of Article 4(A)(1).
If Article 4(A)(1) does not incorporate these four conditions—they are not
mentioned until Article(A)(2), and had previously been read as applying only
there21—then the logic of the President’s collective determinations falls out,
even assuming he had the authority to make them in the first place. Because
the Article 4 debate has been well-covered elsewhere, I focus here on the
narrower question of whether the President’s determinations have removed all
“doubt” regarding the POW status of all the detainees at Guantanamo and thus
rendered Article 5 moot.
The authors acknowledge that the President’s “centralized and unitary
mass appraisals might initially appear at odds with the individual adjudications
prescribed by Article 5 . . . .”22 Indeed, Article 5 refers specifically and repeatedly
to “persons” who “shall enjoy the protection of the present Convention until
such time as their status has been determined by a competent tribunal.”23 Thus
it is Article 5 tribunals, not the executive, who are the proper adjudicators of
whether a particular group or individual captured in the course of a conflict
belongs to any of the categories mentioned in Article 4.24
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Moreover, Army Regulation 190-8,25 on which the CSRTs themselves were
patterned, was adopted to implement the Geneva Convention26 and cites the
Geneva Conventions for the basis of its interpretation.27 Though Corn, Jensen,
and Watts fail to mention the Regulation, it confirms that Article 5’s focus is on
individual classifications and that “doubt” cannot be erased by a unilateral, ex
ante determination by “central command.” The regulation specifies that “[a]
competent tribunal shall determine the status of any person not appearing to
be entitled to prisoner of war status who has committed a belligerent act or has
engaged in hostile activities in aid of enemy armed forces, and who asserts that
he or she is entitled to treatment as a prisoner of war, or concerning whom any
doubt of a like nature exists.”28
But we don’t have to take the detainees’ word for it. According to a 2006
study of newly released evidence from the CSRTs, even by the government’s
own count nearly one in five of the detainees “are not affiliated with either al
Qaeda or the Taliban,”29 the two groups the President has said do not fall
within Article 4. Are these detainees to be automatically denied POW status
unless and until “central command” determines that they are members of a
“pre-approved” fighting force? Even of the detainees who are alleged to be
somehow connected to al Qaeda or the Taliban, sixty percent are only
“associated with” those groups, not “members of,” or “fighting for” them.30
Moreover, ninety-three percent of the detainees were not captured by the
United States.31 Some were turned in by bounty hunters and reward seekers.32
These detainees might have simply been in the wrong place at the wrong time,
or they might be members of the kinds of militias, military groups, and selfdefense forces which are covered by Article 4 and which were, as the authors
recognize,33 entitled to Article 5 hearings and Article 4 protection in Vietnam.
These are exactly the kinds of difficult, individual factual questions that
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demand case-by-case adjudication by “competent tribunals.” And considering
that the United States conducted nearly 1200 such tribunals in the Persian Gulf
War,34 adjudicating the status of the few hundred detainees at Guantanamo
would not be prohibitively difficult.
Corn, Jensen, and Watts raise the possibility that Article 5 tribunals might
reach “disparate and inconsistent results for captives even from the same
fighting organizations.”35 This possibility of “inconsistency” is no greater than
in any other adjudicatory context, nor is it necessarily any more problematic.
To the contrary, the unique circumstances of the war in Afghanistan—the
shifting alliances, multiplicity of “fighting organizations,” and different levels
of individual participation—actually reinforce the importance of individualized,
fact-based determinations, rather than conflict- and group-wide
determinations by central command. The “practical concern” with
“inconsistent results” is less weighty than the problematic consistency that
Corn, Jensen, and Watts propose: that all detainees, no matter the level of their
involvement with the Taliban or al Qaeda, are to be denied POW status based
on the President’s novel and questionable ex ante determinations.
The danger in Corn, Jensen, and Watts’s “three-step” characterization is
that it threatens to further concentrate powers of classification in an already
powerful executive and to eviscerate what the authors call the “third step”—the
Article 5 tribunals that should actually be the first step of classification. If the
President had power, under Article 4(A)(1), to invoke collective criteria and
deny POW status to all opposing forces, the basic purpose of Article 5 would be
defeated. Neither the Geneva Conventions nor the realities of the conflict in
Afghanistan compel this result. Far from rendering these tribunals superfluous,
the nature of the conflict in Afghanistan actually highlights the importance of
Article 5 and the failure of the CSRTs to fulfill it.
In the past month, two military judges have ruled that a CSRT’s finding of
enemy combatant status, even when coupled with the President’s
determination that members of al Qaeda and the Taliban are unlawful
combatants, is an insufficient basis for the military commissions to exercise
jurisdiction.36 And on June 29, in a reversal of its own earlier denial of
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certiorari, the Supreme Court voted to hear argument on the rights of
Guantanamo detainees to challenge their detention in federal courts.37
Whether or not the Court finds that the military tribunals are an adequate
substitute for federal habeas, it is increasingly clear that the CSRTs—whose
enemy combatant determinations have been at the heart of that jurisdictional
battle—did not, and could not, serve as the Article 5 tribunals the Geneva
Conventions require.
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